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Overconfidence and Excess Entry: An Experimental Approach 
By COLIN CAMERER AND DAN LOVALLO * 
Psychological studies show that most peo- 
ple are overconfident about their own relative 
abilities, and unreasonably optimistic about 
their futures (e.g., Neil D. Weinstein, 1980; 
Shelly E. Taylor and J. D. Brown, 1988). 
When assessing their position in a distribution 
of peers on almost any positive trait-like 
driving ability (Ola Svenson, 1981), income 
prospects, or longevity-a vast majority of 
people say they are above the average, al- 
though of course, only half can be (if the trait 
is symmetrically distributed).' 
This paper explores whether optimistic bi- 
ases could plausibly and predictably influence 
economic behavior in one particular setting- 
entry into competitive games or markets. 
Many empirical studies show that most new 
businesses fail within a few years. For exam- 
ple, using plant-level data from the U.S. Cen- 
sus of Manufacturers spanning 1963 -1982, 
Timothy Dunne et al. (1988) estimated that 
61.5 percent of all entrants exited within five 
years and 79.6 percent exited within ten years. 
Most of these exits are failures (see also Dan- 
iel Shapiro and R. S. Khemani, 1987; Dunne 
et al., 1989a, b; Paul A. Geroski, 1991; John 
R. Baldwin, 1995). 
Some possible explanations for the high rate 
of business failure are reviewed below. In this 
paper we consider the hypothesis that business 
failure is a result of managers acting on the op- 
timism about relative skill they exhibit in sur- 
veys (e.g., James March and Zur Shapira, 
1987). This hypothesis is wortth exploring be- 
cause it is consistent with so much psychological 
evidence, and because optimistic overentry will 
persist if the perfornance feedback necessary to 
correct it is relatively noisy, infrequent, or slow. 
The idea that overconfidence causes business 
entry mistakes has, of course, been suggested 
before (e.g., Richard Roll, 1986) but has not 
been directly tested by measuring economic de- 
cisions and personal overconfidence simulta- 
neously. To link the two we created an 
experimental setting with basic features of busi- 
ness entry situations. In the experiments, the suc- 
cess of entering subjects depends on their 
relative skill (compared to other entrants). Most 
subjects who enter think the total profit earned 
by all entrants will be negative, but their own 
profit will be positive. The findings are consis- 
tent with the prediction that overconfidence 
leads to excessive business entry. 
The experiments also develop a paradigm 
in which business entry and other skill-based 
competitions (e.g., labor-market tourn- 
aments) could be studied further. The 
paradigm extends typical economics exper- 
iments by including a potentially potent 
psychological variable-relative skill per- 
ceptions-and also extends typical psychol- 
ogy experiments on overconfidence by 
adding financial incentives for judging one's 
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' There are interesting exceptions-most people de- 
murely say they are not in the very top decile or quintile, 
but merely above average; for many traits, women are less 
optimistic than men (and even overly pessimistic; e.g., 
Eleanor E. Maccoby and Carol N. Jacklin, 1974); and 
clinically depressed patients are not optimistic (e.g., 
Lauren B. Alloy and Anthony H. Ahrens, 1987). The lat- 
ter finding calls into question the common psychiatric pre- 
sumption that "realistic" people are well adjusted and 
happy, and also raises the question of whether unrealistic 
optimism might be evolutionarily adaptive (e.g., Lionel 
Tiger, 1979) or socially beneficial (Giovanni Dosi and 
Lovallo, 1997). Michael Waldman (1994) shows how 
such optimism could be evolutionarily stable, and men- 
tions conditions under which gender differences like those 
observed empirically could arise. 
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skill accurately and a clear definition of the 
skill one is judging.2 
Of course, experimental data are hardly con- 
clusive evidence that overconfidence plays a 
role in actual entry decisions by firms. A big- 
ger scientific payoff comes when experimental 
observations suggest a new phenomenon that 
might be studied in the field. Our data suggest 
a new phenomenon we call "reference group 
neglect." Excess entry is much larger when 
subjects volunteered to participate knowing 
that payoffs would depend on skill. These self- 
selected subjects seem to neglect the fact that 
they are competing with a reference group of 
subjects who all think they are skilled too. 
(Neglecting the increased level of competition 
is like the neglect of adverse selection which 
leads to the "winner's curse" in bidding.) 
L. Possible Explanations for Entrant Failure 
There are three primary explanations for the 
frequency of entrant failure. The first expla- 
nation is that failures are frequent because en- 
trants have only brief opportunities to make 
money. In this view, failures are actually hit- 
and-run entries that are profitable but brief. 
A second explanation is that business entries 
are expensive lottery tickets with positively 
skewed returns. In this view, although most 
firms expect to lose money and fail, entry still 
maximizes expected profits because the pay- 
offs to success are very large. There are two 
variants of this argument: First, if small- 
business owners are risk preferring or get psy- 
chic income from running businesses, then the 
expected utility from entering might be high 
even if expected profit is low. Second, it is 
well known from multiarmed bandit problems 
that when sampling from unknown distribu- 
tions of possible payoffs (such as career paths 
or profitable industries), it may pay to sample 
from "arms" with negative expected payoffs 
if the possible payoffs from those arms is large 
(because sampling provides information about 
which arms to choose in the future). Models 
of occupational choice provide a clear life- 
cycle prediction based on this sampling motive 
for entry, since people should bear the risk of 
failure early in their careers, but not later (e.g., 
Robert A. Miller, 1984). 
The third explanation is that many entry 
decisions are mistakes, made by boundedly ra- 
tional decision makers. Firms could mistak- 
enly enter too often for two different reasons - 
they know their own skills but fail to appre- 
ciate how many competitors there will be 
(they have "competitive blind spots"), or 
they forecast competition accurately but over- 
confidently think their firm will succeed while 
most others will fail. 
In a natural setting it is difficult to distin- 
guish between these three explanations for 
high failure rates. The overconfidence expla- 
nation is particularly hard to establish because 
it predicts that firms will enter even if they 
expect negative industry profits. But even if 
cumulative industry profits are actually nega- 
tive at some point in time, it is possible posi- 
tive returns will roll in later (or the industry 
simply made a large unpredictable forecasting 
mistake). So it is hard to imagine how to es- 
tablish conclusively that expected industry re- 
turns were negative. 
While more field research is surely worth- 
while, some progress might be made in the 
laboratory. In an experiment, everything 
needed to distinguish the three theories- 
entry decisions, forecasts of industry profits, 
and forecasts of the number of total entrants- 
can be measured. If subjects forecast positive 
industry profits and enter, the rational-entry 
theories appear correct. If subjects forecast 
positive industry profits, but they underesti- 
mate the amount of entry and industry profit 
turns out to be negative, then the blind spots 
story appears correct. If subjects accurately 
forecast negative industry profits, and enter 
anyway, then the overconfidence explanation 
appears correct. 
II. Experimental Design 
Our experiments extend a paradigm first 
used by Daniel Kahneman (1988), Jim 
Brander, and Richard Thaler, then explored 
more throughly by Amnon Rapoport and 
colleagues. 
2 Earlier studies showed that overconfidence is larger 
when traits are defined ambiguously-"driving ability" is 
more ambiguous than "ability to brake quickly to avoid an 
accident" (David Dunning et al., 1989; Lovallo, 1996). 
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In their game, N players choose simulta- 
neously, and without communicating, whether 
to enter a market or not. The market "capac- 
ity" is a preannounced number, c. If players 
stay out they earn a payment K. If the total 
number of entrants is E, the entrants each earn 
K + rK(c - E) (with rK > 0). The optimal 
behavior is simple: Players want to enter only 
if the number of expected entrants (including 
themselves) is less than the capacity c. If they 
do enter, players prefer the number of entrants 
to be as small as possible. The interesting 
questions are whether the right number of 
players enter (is E around c?), whether E 
changes with c, and how players figure out 
whether to enter or not. 
Kahneman (1988) was surprised to see that 
the number of entrants, E, was typically in the 
range [c - 2, c + 2] even though subjects 
could not communicate or coordinate their de- 
cisions in any explicit way. "To a psycholo- 
gist," he wrote, "it looks like magic." 
Rapoport (1995) replicated the results using 
Ph.D. students playing for much larger stakes. 
He also found that subjects entered a bit too 
frequently at first, but gradually E converged 
very close to c. E and c were highly correlated 
across trials. Extensions by James Sundali et 
al. (1995) and Rapoport et al. (1998a) repli- 
cated the earlier findings. Rapoport et al. 
(1998b) introduced probabilistic payoffs and 
showed that deviations from equilibrium entry 
could be parsimoniously explained by nonlin- 
ear transformations of entry probabilities. 
Our experiments extend this paradigm in 
four ways: Payoffs depend on a subject's rank 
(relative to other entrants); ranks depend on 
either a chance device, or on a subject's skill; 
subjects in some experiments are told in ad- 
vance that the experiment depends on skill 
(and hence, more skilled subjects presumably 
self-select into the experiment); and subjects 
forecast the number of entrants in each period. 
Skill-dependent payoffs are the crucial new 
design feature. The early experiments capture 
an important aspect of entry-tacit coordina- 
tion among potential entrants to avoid excess 
entry - but all entrants earned the same 
amount. In naturally occurring settings, somne 
entrants win and others lose, due at least partly 
to differences in managerial skill (see Kenneth 
R. MacCrim-mon and Donald A. Wehrung, 
TABLE 1-RANK-BASED) PAYOFFS 
Payoff for successful entrants 
as a function of "c" 
Rank 2 4 6 8 
1 33 20 14 1 1 
2 17 15 12 10 
3 10 10 8 
4 5 7 7 
5 5 6 
6 2 4 
7 3 
8 2 
1986). Besides being more realistic, differ- 
ences in payoffs based on skill allow the pos- 
sibility that overconfidence will lead to excess 
entry. 
Table I shows how payoffs depend on a 
subject's rank and on the market capacity c. 
The top c entrants share $50 proportionally, 
with higher-ranking entrants earning more. All 
entrants ranking below the top c lose $10. For 
examnple, if the market capacity c = 2, then the 
highest-ranked entrant receives $33, the sec 
ond highest-ranked entrant receives $17, and 
any lower-ranked entrant loses $10. (Subjects 
are staked $10 initially.) Notice that if the 
number of entrants is exactly c + 5 then the 
total payoff to all entering subjects ("industry 
profit") is zero; if there are more than c + 5 
entrants, the average entrant loses money. 
Actual ranks are assigned in two different 
ways: Each subject is ranked by a random 
drawing, and also ranked according to his rel- 
ative performance on a skill or trivia task. Skill 
ranks are determined by how many questions 
subjects answer correctly on a sample of 10 
logic puzzles (sessions 1-2) or trivia ques- 
tions about sports or current events (sessions 
3-8). It is important to stress that subjects' 
ranks were not determined until the end of the 
experiment, after they made all their entry de- 
cisions in both the skill and random 
conditions. 
Here are the steps in ea ch experimental 
session: 
I. Before the experiment, subjects were re- 
cruited using either standard recruiting in- 
structions or "self-selection" instructions. 
VOL. 89 NO. I CAMERER AND LOVALLO: OVERCONFIDENCE AND EXCESS ENTRY 309 
TABLE 2-MARKET CAPACITY "C" VALUES 
Rounds Experiment 1 Experiment 2 Experiments 3-6 Experiments 7 & 8 
1 2 8 2 4 
2 4 4 6 2 
3 8 2 4 6 
4 6 6 4 8 
5 4 4 2 6 
6 2 2 6 4 
7 8 8 4 2 
8 6 6 6 8 
9 4 4 2 6 
10 6 2 6 4 
11 8 8 4 2 
12 2 6 2 8 
In the self-selection condition, subjects 
were asked if they would like to volunteer 
for an expeliment in which performance on 
sports or current events trivia would deter- 
mine their payoff, and people who were 
very good might earn a considerable sum 
of money. (They were also reminded in the 
experimental instructions that all subjects 
were recruited this way.) 
2. Subjects were seated in a large classroom 
where they could not see each other's ma- 
terials. The instructions were read aloud 
and a comprehension test was given to 
guarantee understanding of the payoff ta- 
ble. The two types of ranking systems were 
explained and subjects were shown exam- 
ples of the skill questions, along with sam- 
ple answers. Subjects were informed that 
there would be two sequences of 12 rounds 
for each condition -one for the random 
rank and another for the skill rank. Subjects 
were also informed that the decisions they 
made for one of the rounds, chosen ran- 
domly, would determine their payoff. 
Individual rounds proceed as follows: 
3. Subjects were told whether skill or random 
ranks are being used in that round, and the 
capacity c. Table 2 shows the capacities 
used in each round. The same sequence of 
capacities was used in the two consecutive 
conditions within a session. 
4. Subjects privately forecasted how many en- 
trants they expected would enter (including 
themselves) in the round. They earned 
$0.25 for each forecast that was correct. 
These forecasts distinguish the hypothesis 
that too many subjects enter because they 
underestimate the numnber of competitors 
("blind spots") from the hypothesis that 
subjects forecast entry accurately, but en- 
trants all think they are above average. 
5. Subjects made their entry decisions pri- 
vately and simultaneously.3 
6. Entry decisions were recorded and subjects 
were told how many total entrants there 
were in the round. Thus, the only feedback 
that subjects received after each round is 
the total number of entrants for each period. 
7. At the end of the experimental session, af- 
ter all of the rounds in both conditions were 
played, subjects either solved puzzles or 
took the trivia quiz, and their skill rank was 
determined and announced. Then one of 
the subjects randomly chose one of the 24 
rounds and subjects' eamings from that 
round were computed and paid to them. 
It is important to reiterate that the only feed- 
back subjects got throughout the session of 24 
rounds was the total number of entrants per 
3 In one session, not reported here, we allowed deci- 
sions to be made sequentially. This means that a subject 
moving after c + 5 entrants have already entered knows 
for sure that the total payment to subjects will be negative; 
entering in that condition is the strongest possible evi- 
dence that subjects are relatively overconfident. Roughly 
the same number of subjects entered in that session, but 
too few data are available from the single session to draw 
firmer conclusions. 
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TABLE 3--DESCRIPTION OF EXPERIMENTS 
Experiment# Sample n Selection procedure Rank order 
1 Chicago, undergraduates 12 random RJS 
2 Chicago, undergraduates 14 random S/R 
3 Wharton, undergraduates 16 random R/S 
4 Wharton, undergraduates 16 random S/R 
5 Wharton, undergraduates 16 self-selection RIS 
6 Wharton, undergraduates 16 self-selection SIR 
7 Chicago, M.B.A.'s 14 self-selection R/S 
8 Wharton, M.B.A.'s 14 self-selection S/R 
round. This design was chosen to model initial 
entry behavior by firms that do not learn much 
about their competitive advantage until after 
they incur substantial nonsalvageable fixed 
costs. The question of how post-entry feed- 
back about performance impacts subsequent 
behavior is interesting, of course-it is cer- 
tainly likely that overconfidence would be di- 
minished if subjects were given a separate skill 
test and told their ranks after each round. But 
it is natural to begin by establishing whether 
overconfidence is present in the first place, be- 
fore turning to the question of what forces 
make it go away. 
The procedures described above were used 
in eight sessions. Table 3 summarizes differ- 
ences in treatment variables across sessions.4 
In half of the experimental sessions the 
random-rank condition rounds were conducted 
first; in the other half the skill-rank rounds 
were first. Four sessions involved self-selected 
subjects (who knew trivia skill would help) 
and four sessions did not. 
A. Equilibrium Predictions 
Assuming risk neutrality, there are many 
pure-strategy Nash equilibria in which c + 4 
or c + 5 subjects enter (the fifth subject is 
indifferent since he or she expects to earn zero 
from entering). Since the pure-strategy equi- 
libria are necessarily asymmetric, it is hard to 
see how they might arise without communi- 
cation or some coordinating device, like his- 
tory, sequential moves, or public labels 
distinguishing subjects. There is also a unique 
symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium in 
which (risk-neutral) players enter with a prob- 
ability close to (c + 5)/N (see Lovallo and 
Camerer, 1996). 
Relaxing the assumption of risk neutrality, 
there is no way to determine the equilibrium 
number of entrants without measuring or mak- 
ing specific assumnptions about subjects' risk 
preferences.S The random-rank condition 
gives an empirical estimate of observed equi- 
librium without having to impose any a priori 
assumption about risk preferences. Since sub- 
jects participate in both random- and skill-rank 
conditions, their decisions in the random-rank 
condition act as a within-subject control for 
risk preferences. The difference in the number 
of entrants in the random and skill conditions 
is the primary measure of interest. 
IlLo Results 
A. Does Overconfidence About Skill 
Increase Entry? 
Table 4 lists the total amount of money 
earned by subjects ("industry profit") per 
4 Business students, especially M.B.A.'s, are an appro- 
priate sample because many go on to start businesses or 
participate in corporate entry decisions (e.g., entrepre- 
neurship is the fifth most popular major among Wharton 
M.B.A.'s). 
5An alternative is to try to induce risk neutrality (or 
some other specific degree of risk aversion) by paying 
subjects in units of probability (see Joyce E. Berg et al., 
1986). We chose to use the random-rank condition be- 
cause the probability procedure does not induce risk neu- 
trality reliably (see Reinhard Selten et al., 1995; cf., Vesna 
Prasnikar, 1996), and the random-rank condition is 
equally theoretically valid, and simpler. 
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TABLE 4-INDUSTRY PROFIT BY ROUND 
Profit for random-rank condition 
Rounds 
Experiment# n 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 Total 
1 12 50 50 20 30 40 30 20 50 30 40 20 40 420 
2 14 0 -10 10 20 -10 10 20 10 0 0 30 20 100 
3 16 10 50 20 40 10 20 30 40 20 40 30 20 330 
4 16 0 10 10 20 10 -10 0 10 20 10 0 20 100 
5 16 20 10 10 10 0 0 30 20 -10 0 0 0 90 
6 16 30 20 10 0 -10 30 20 10 10 30 10 20 180 
7 14 10 20 40 20 30 40 -30 40 10 0 0 20 200 
8 14 20 10 0 30 30 0 10 10 20 10 20 40 200 
Profit for skill-rank condition 
Rounds 
Experiment# n 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 Total 
1 12 50 0 20 10 30 10 20 10 40 10 10 30 240 
2 14 0 -10 10 20 --10 10 20 10 0 0 30 20 100 
3 16 10 20 10 20 0 10 20 10 10 30 20 10 180 
4 16 0 0 20 20 10 -30 10 -10 -10 10 -20 0 0 
5 16 -30 -20 -20 -10 -40 -10 -30 0 -30 -10 -20 0 -220 
6 16 10 -40 -20 -30 -10 -30 -10 -20 -20 -10 0 0 -180 
7 14 -40 -10 -10 0 -20 -10 -40 0 0 0 -10 0 -140 
8 14 10 -10 -10 -10 -20 -20 -20 0 -20 10 -20 -20 -130 
round in each experimental session, by rank 
condition. Recall that if c subjects enter, total 
industry profit is $50. If c + 5 enter, total prof- 
its are 0. 
The main question is whether there is more 
entry (and lower industry profit) when people 
are betting on their own relative skill rather 
than on a random device. The answer is 
"Yes": In the majority of the random-rank 
rounds (74/96 or 77 percent) industry profit 
is strictly positive6 and total profit is negative 
only six times (6 percent). Average industry 
profit across rounds is $16.87. In contrast, in 
the skill-rank rounds industry profit is strictly 
positive in only 37 rounds (40 percent) and 
negative in 41 (42 percent). Average profit 
across the skill-rank rounds is -$1.56. The 
difference in average profits between the con- 
ditions is $18.43, which is about two extra en- 
trants per round in the skill c,onditions (about 
a third of the number expected to not enter). 
A powerful statistical test of significance ex- 
ploits the yoked design by comparing industry 
profit in each pair of skill-rank and random- 
rank periods in exactly the same periods of 
experimental sessions t and t + 1 (for t = 1, 
3, 5, 7). In this comparison, each pair of pe- 
riods has exactly the same location in experi- 
mental time and the same value of c, and differ 
only in whether ranks were due to skill or 
chance. (Fixed effects of periods, self- 
selection, and subject pool are all controlled 
for by this comparison.) A miatched-pair t-test 
using these comparisons yields t = -7.43 
(dof = 95,p < 0.0001). Industry profits under 
skill-based entry are clearly lower. 
The next question is whether reference 
group neglect produces a larger skill-random 
entry differential in the experiments with self- 
selected subjects. The answer appears to be 
"Yes." In sessions without self-selection (1 - 
4), the average per-period industry profit is 
$19.79 and $10.83 for the random and skill 
6 This is also consistent with tacit collusion among risk- 
neutral players, since having exactly c entrants is the col- 
lusive solution (but is not a Nash equilibrium), or with 
some degree of risk aversion or (more likely) loss 
aversion. 
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TABLE 5-AVERAGE DIFFERENCE IN EXPECTED PROFITS PER ENTRANT BETWEEN RANDOM AND SKILL CONDITIONS 
Experiment Experiment Experiment Experiment Experiment Experiment Experiment Experiment 
Measure 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Total 
nl, - Fl, 1.635 0.477 -1.19 0.24 1.62 2.49 3.16 1.80 1.31 
(1.98) (1.41) (1.72) (2.41) (1.32) (1.27) (1.61) (1.20) (2.04) 
# of S's with 10/12 10/13 3/11 7/14 12/13 12/13 13/13 11/12 78/101 
nL, - nLI < 0 (83) (77) (27) (50) (92) (92) (100) (92) (77) 
(percent) 
# of S's with 0/12 0/13 0/12 2/15 12/15 15/16 12/14 11/14 52/111 
nLI < 0 (0) (0) (0) (13) (80) (94) (86) (79) (47) 
(percent) 
conditions, respectively-a difference of 
$9.14, or about one extra entrant in the skill- 
based rounds. In sessions with self-selection 
(5-8) profit is $13.96 in the random condition 
and -$13.13 in the skill condition, which re- 
sults in an entry differential of $27.10- about 
three times as large as in the sessions without 
self-selection. Furthermore, in the experiments 
with self-selection, industry profits are posi- 
tive in only 3 of the 48 skill-rank periods, com- 
pared with 34 of 48 in the non-self-selected 
sessions. A matched-pairs test comparing the 
skill-random profit differentials for matched 
periods between sessions 1-4 and 5-8 
strongly rejects the hypothesis that differen- 
tials are the same in sessions with and without 
self-selection (t(94) = -4.08, p < 0.001). 
Reference group neglect clearly makes the 
overconfidence effect stronger. 
B. Expected Earnings Differences in Skill 
and Random Rounds 
The matched-pairs tests illustrate the effect 
of overconfidence on entry and demonstrate 
that self-selection makes the effect stronger. 
But these tests do not carefully control for all 
alternative explanations.7 For example, the 
blind spots hypothesis suggests that excessive 
entry in the skill conditions may be due to 
players underforecasting how many others 
will enter. 
To test this hypothesis, we use subjectj's 
forecast Fijt to compute the profit that subject j expects the average entrant to earn in round 
t of experiment i. If the capacity is cit in that 
particular period, then the "expected aver- 
age profit" -the amount of profit subject j 
thinks the average entrant will earn-is 
(50-10*(Fijt - ci- )Fijt, which we denote 
by Ej(flijt). This method effectively sepa- 
rates the blind spots hypothesis from the 
overconfidence hypothesis. Suppose, for ex- 
ample, that in skill conditions subjects are 
more apt to enter because they think fewer 
people will enter, not because they feel they 
are more skilled. Then their Ej(H1ijt) values 
will be larger in the skill condition. Includ- 
ing Ej(Hlijt) in an entry regression will then 
wipe out the effect spuriously attributed to 
skill. 
If entering subjects are more overconfident 
in the skill rounds, then their expected average 
profits E(IIijt) will be smaller than in random 
rounds because the skilled subjects expect to 
earn more than the average entrant and, hence, 
are willing to enter even when the expected 
average profit is low. To test this prediction, 
Table 5 reports the difference between ex- 
pected average profits in random rounds (de- 
noted Hr) and the same statistic in skill rounds 
(ITs), using only the rounds in which a subject 
entered. The table shows three different mea- 
sures for each session: The mean difference 
nr- 1I averaged across entering subjects, the 
number and percentage of subjects who have 
a negative mean (i.e., who expect less average 
profit in skill periods), and the number and 
percentage of subjects whose expected aver- 
7 Gender could be confounded with self-selection, too, 
since women may be less likely to volunteer for tasks 
which reward expertise in sports trivia (and are usually 
found to be less overconfident than men, in general). We 
controlled for this by only recruiting male subjects in ses- 
sions 3-8. Thus, the logit analysis of sessions 3-8 effec- 
tively controls for gender. 
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age profit is negative, on average, across skill 
periods. 
In sessions without self-selection ( 1 -4) the 
mean difference 171 - II1 is generally positive 
and modestly significant-60 percent of the 
subjects expect to earn less in skill periods, but 
only a few subjects (4 percent) actually expect 
losses in skill periods. In the sessions with self- 
selection (4-8) the statistics are more strik- 
ing: There are large, modestly significant 
average differences I - II, in all four ses- 
sions (almost all subjects expect to earn less 
in skill periods than in random periods), and 
85 percent of the subjects have negative ex- 
pected average profits in skill periods. The 
large majority of subjects in the self-selection 
sessions seem to be saying, "I expect the av- 
erage entrant to lose money, but not me!" 
C. Regression Estimates of the 
Overconfidence Effect 
Another way to see the size and significance 
of all the variables' effects at once is a logit 
regression in which the dependent variable is 
subject j's 0-1 entry decision (enter = 1) in 
round t of experiment i, Dij,. The logit includes 
controls for period-specific intercepts (to cap- 
ture any period-by-period influences on en- 
try), a subject pool dummy (MBA = 1), a 
self-selection condition dummy (RNG = 1), 
capacity c, and a skill-rank dummy (Skill - 
1). 
Table 6 shows the results of the logit re- 
gression of entry decisions.8 Period-specific 
dummy variables were never significant and 
are not reported. Curiously, E(fij) enters with 
a negative sign, implying that when subjects 
expect high average profit they enter less of- 
ten. This odd result is robust to several speci- 
fications but it does not disrupt inferences 
about skill.9 The dummy variable MBA enters 
positively but the MBA *Skill interaction does 
not. 
Most importantly, the effect of the Skill con- 
dition variable is significantly positive (t = 
2.48) in the full model but the interaction 
of self-selection and skill, RNG*Skill, is in- 
significant. The middle column drops the un- 
interesting variables MBA, MBA*Skill, and 
the insignificant main effect of RNG. Then 
RNG*Skill becomes significant (t = 1.90), 
confirming that self-selection significantly in- 
creases the tendency to enter more frequently 
when payoffs depend on skill.10 The right col- 
umn excludes the RNG*Skill interaction, 
which increases the estimated coefficient and 
significance of the pure skill effect (t = 4.83). 
Comparing the log-likelihoods with and with- 
out RNG*Skill also shows that including it 
improves fit significantly (X2 = 3.6, p = 
0.05), corroborating the results of the t-test. 
D. Additional Analyses: Forecasts and 
Equilibrium Behavior 
Since subjects forecasted the number of en- 
trants in each period, we can test whether their 
forecasts reflect rational use of available in- 
formation (see Lovallo and. Camerer [1996] 
for more details). Forecasts are slightly bi- 
ased: In random conditions subjects forecast 
about 0.30 entrants too high, and in skill con- 
ditions they forecast 0.50 entrants too low (the 
latter bias is significantly negative at p < 
0.05). We have no explanation for these small 
8 The regression uses only data from sessions 3-8 be- 
cause sessions 1-2 used a different task (logic puzzles 
rather than trivia) and did not include self-selection as a 
treatment, so including it does not give much extra power 
for estimating the effect of RNG. 
' We also included capacity c as a series of dummy 
variables (to capture nonlinearity in the effect of c on en- 
try), and included interactions between E(Fij,) and Skill, 
and between E( ij,) and c. None of these specifications 
improved the fit substantially or eliminated the significant 
negative coefficient on E(nij,). We suspect the result oc- 
curs because when subjects plan to enter, they also fore- 
cast a lot of entry, so the expected average profit E( HV) 
is lower when they enter. This could be due to a "false 
consensus" in which subjects use their own decision as a 
clue about what others will do (and, because of optimism, 
they do not let their forecast inhibit their own entry). 
0 Excluding the RNG *Skill interaction from the sec- 
ond model raises the estimated coefficient and significance 
of the pure skill effect (0.450, t = 4.83), which suggests 
that the precision of the estimates of skill and RNG*Skill 
in the middle-column specification are a lot lower because 
of the colinearity between skill and RNG*Skill. Compar- 
ing the log-likelihoods with and without RNG*Skill also 
shows that including it improves fit significantly (X2 = 
3.6,p= 0.0.5). 
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TABLE 6-LOGIT ESTIMATION OF ENTRY EQUATION (SESSIONS 3-8, n 2,204) 
Dependent variable: Entry (= 1) 
Variable Estimate (t-statistic) Estimate (t-statistic) Estimate (t-statistic) 
Intercept -0.887 (-3.28) -0.855 (-3.40) -0.865 (-3.21) 
c 0.233 (6.93) 0.257 (7.99) 0.258 (8.06) 
E(x j) -0.129 (-6.93) -0.126 (-6.65) -0.144 (-8.72) 
Skill 0.375 (2.48) 0.286 (2.26) 0.450 (4.83) 
MBA 0.283 (1.76) 
RNG 0.011 (0.01) 
MBA*Skill 0.196 (0.83) 
RNG*Skill 0.078 (0.35) 0.299 (1.90) 
Log-likelihood -1366.8 -1372.5 -1374.3 
Percent correct 64.84 64.02 64.34 
biases and do not attach much economic sig- 
nificance to them. For most subjects, forecasts 
pass the standard rationality tests because fore- 
cast errors are not predicted by observable in- 
formation (i.e., by previous errors, or by the 
current forecast level). When errors are pre- 
dictable, they tend to flip in the opposite di- 
rection of previous errors, and errors are 
positively correlated with levels (i.e., when 
forecasts are high, they are too high so the 
forecast error is positive). 
Compared to other economics experiments 
in which paid forecasts have been gathered 
(cf., Camerer, 1995 pp. 609-12), the infor- 
mational rationality of these forecasts is quite 
good. This fact is important because it means 
subjects are not generally irrational in pro- 
cessing information and they do not overenter 
because they underforecast the amount of 
competition. They are just overconfident about 
their relative skill. 
The time series of matched-pair skill- 
random differentials in entry has a slight 
downward trend across periods. This raises the 
important question of whether the effect of 
overconfidence on entry would disappear if the 
experiment were run longer. A helpful way to 
forecast the answer is to fit a time-series model 
which estimates the long-run differential by 
extrapolating from 12 periods of data to what 
would happen if the experiment were run for- 
ever (see Camerer, 1987). Our working paper 
reports estimates from three different models. 
One model assumes partial adaptation of de- 
viations from long-run equilibrium. Two other 
models assume those deviations drop with the 
reciprocal or reciprocal square root of the pe- 
rod number. The three techniques yield esti- 
mated differentials of 1.96, 1.79, and 1.34 (all 
of which are highly significant). 
These numbers suggest that even if the ex- 
periment was repeated for a much longer time, 
one or two more subjects would enter when 
their payoffs depend on skill, relative to the 
number who enter than when payoffs are ran- 
dom. Keep in mind that an average of five or 
six subjects are predicted to stay out in each 
period (depending on the design). Two extra 
entrants means that more than a third of the 
number who are predicted to stay out actually 
enter. 
IV. Discussion 
Empirical studies show a high rate of busi- 
ness failure. We explored whether overconfi- 
dence about relative ability is part of the 
explanation for excessive failure by creating 
experimental entry games in which entrants' 
payoffs depend on their skill. 
When subjects' post-entry payoffs are based 
on their own abilities, individuals tend to over- 
estimate their chances of relative success and 
enter more frequently (compared to a condi- 
tion in which payoffs do not depend on skill), 
The more surprising finding is that overconfi- 
dence is even stronger when subjects self- 
select into the experimental sessions, knowing 
their success will depend partly on their skill 
(and that others have self-selected too). In 
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these sessions, there is so much entry that the 
average subject loses money in 34 out of 48 
periods, and earns money in only four periods. 
This result suggests a new phenomenon spe- 
cific to competition, "reference group ne- 
glect" -the tendency to underadjust to 
changes in the reference group one competes 
with. 
Reference group neglect is one byproduct of 
a psychological phenomenon called the "in- 
side view" (Kahneman and Lovallo, 1993). 
An inside view forecast is generated by focus- 
ing on the abilities and resources of a partic- 
ular group, constructing scenarios of future 
progress, and extrapolating current trends. In 
contrast, an "outside view" ignores special 
details of the case at hand, constructs a class 
of cases similar to the current one, and guesses 
where the current case lies in that class (cf., 
Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). The inside 
view tells a colorful story; the outside view 
recites statistics. In the inside view, there is no 
special role for anticipation of the number of 
competitors or their abilities. In the outside 
view, the fact that most entries fail cannot be 
ignored. 
Reference group neglect was nicely ex- 
pressed by Joe Roth, chairman of Walt 
Disney Studios, when he was asked why so 
many expensive big-budget movies are re- 
leased on the same weekends (such as Me- 
morial Day and Independence Day). Roth 
replied: 
Hubris. Hubris. If you only think about 
your own business, you think, "I've got 
a good story department, I've got a good 
marketing department, we're going to go 
out and do this." And you don't think 
that everybody else is thinking the same 
way. In a given weekend in a year you'll 
have five movies open, and there's cer- 
tainly not enough people to go around. 
(Emphasis ours; Los Angeles Times, 
1996 p. F8.) 
A. Some Testable Economic Implications 
Experimental results are especially useful 
when they suggest implications which are 
testable with naturally occurring data. If 
people are generally overconfident about 
their relative abilities, then in industries or 
professions where overconfidence is likely 
to be largest, industry profits or total wages 
(including costs of training) may be nega- 
tive. This brings us full circle to the empir- 
ical facts about business failure, and the 
difficulty of clearly establishing negative in- 
dustry profit. The key to empirical tests 
which distinguish overconfidence from other 
explanations is to find variables which pre- 
dict levels of overconfidence and see if they 
correlate with the tendency for overall profit 
to be negative. For example, when the cri- 
terion for success is more vague, people or 
firms should be more likely to overcompete, 
since ambiguity permits excess optimism. 
This implies that in professions where suc- 
cess can be achieved by different types of 
people, or industries with highly differenti- 
ated products, excess entry is more likely. 
For example, the skills required to be a suc- 
cessful model seem to be narrower than the 
skills required to be a successful actor. If so, 
your waiter at a Los Angeles restaurant is 
more likely to be an aspiring actor than an 
aspiring model. 
The overconfidence hypothesis also pre- 
dicts that people will prefer performance- 
based incentives schemes more often than 
standard theory predicts. Standard theory 
predicts that as output variance rises, prin- 
cipals who can bear risk should offer less 
output-sensitive contracts to agents (who 
presumably dislike risk). Overconfidence 
predicts that agents will be relatively insen- 
sitive to risk; indeed, when risk is high their 
overconfidence might lead them to prefer 
riskier contracts because they think they can 
beat the odds. There is some evidence from 
sharecropping that the standard prediction is 
wrong, and the overconfidence prediction 
may be right. Crops with larger yield varia- 
tion are more likely to be farmed with cash 
leases, where farmers pay a fixed fee to lease 
the land and bear all the crop risk themselves 
(e.g., Douglas W. Allen and Dean Lueck, 
1995). Other evidence from franchising and 
mining show that risk variables play a small 
role in contract determination; the existence 
of overconfidence may explain why. 
Reference group neglect predicts that when 
agents compete based on skill, they will be 
insufficiently sensitive to the quality of 
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competition. This has at least three testable 
implications. 
First, people will gather too little data about 
the nature of their competitors when deciding 
whether to enter. 1 1 
Second, reference group neglect predicts 
that people will be insensitive to whether their 
competitors are forced to compete or choose 
to compete. Empirical tests could compare a 
situation in which entry is dictated by regula- 
tion or law, with a similar situation in which 
people can opt in or out. Reference group ne- 
glect predicts a higher failure rate in the latter 
cases. 12 
Third, in hierarchical tournaments where 
''winners" at one level advance to the next 
level, reference group neglect predicts that 
overconfidence will get stronger and stronger 
as people advance.1" As workers win each 
level of the tournament, their success is cer- 
tainly a positive signal of ability relative to the 
tournament losers left behind, but every other 
winner has received the same positive signal 
too. If winners neglect the fact that competi- 
tion increases at each level, they will become 
more overconfident at each new level. Edu- 
cational attainment might be an example. 
Freshman students at a highly selective college 
will be overconfident (neglecting the large in- 
crease in competition from their high school 
to college) and the effect will get stronger if 
they go to graduate school. Promotion tracks 
in businesses could produce the same pattern 
of snowballing overconfidence: Perhaps as 
cream rises to the top, hubris does too. 
Reference group neglect predicts an oppo- 
site bias when workers lose toumaments and 
consider whether to enter "consolation" tour- 
naments with other losers. Losing workers will 
be underconfident if they neglect how easy the 
new competition is. For example, recently 
fired workers will have unusually long spells 
of unemployment (compared to the spell 
length predicted by optimal search theory), if 
they lick their wounds rather than compete 
with other recently fired workers by searching. 
In addition to reference group neglect and 
its testable implications, an important impli- 
cation of our study is methodological. In some 
settings with uncertainty, it is sensible to char- 
acterize economic agents as making decisions 
about random events, and use chance devices 
in the lab to mimic suich events. However, 
when agents are betting on their own abilities, 
assuming that random luck and skill are the 
same is a mistake (cf., Linda Babcock and 
George Loewenstein, 1997). Indeed, we reach 
different conclusions about equilibrium pre- 
dictions when we use skill-based payoffs in- 
stead of random payoffs-they enter more 
when betting on their skill. This is not to say 
that the subjects behave irrationally-indeed, 
they forecast the number of competitors quite 
well, and most pass tests of expectational ra- 
tionality. They are simply overconfident; and 
the inside view which creates that confidence 
leads them to neglect the quality of their 
competition. 
" For example, prospective doctoral students often do 
not ask about exam failure rates or what jobs all graduates 
get, and academics are surprisingly unfamiliar with accep- 
tance rates of different journals they submit articles to. 
These "outside view" statistics only make cameo ap- 
pearances in the success stories people project for 
themselves. 
12 An example is the difference between an army that 
drafts citizens to serve and a regime in which soldiers 
volunteer. Reference group neglect predicts that soldiers 
who aspire to become high-ranking officers will be too 
optimistic about their chances when they volunteer (be- 
cause many volunteers will share, the same ambition). A 
similar test could turn on differences between compulsory 
and voluntary education, or differences between required 
core courses and electives (students will be more over- 
confident about their success in the, latter courses). 
" Possible examples include political competition,s rat 
races" in professional firms, athletic competition, educa- 
tional competition for entrance into elite colleges and 
graduate schools, and entertainment industries where entry 
is easy and a few "superstar' workers earn large rewards 
(such as acting and screcnwriting). 
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